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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
European Communities*
1. Constitutional and Institutional Matters
The most important innovation in the structure of the European Com-
munities since the accession of Spain and Portugal to the Communities
(and the consequent commencement of the current transitional periods
in respect of those States) has been the agreement by all Member States
amending the Basic Community Treaties. Signed at Luxembourg and the
Hague on February 17 and 28, 1986, the legislation is known as the Single
European Act.' Primarily intended to create a framework for the pro-
motion of greater political cooperation between Member States, this
agreement addresses certain structural and political problems that have
beset the operation of the Basic Treaties 2 for many years. In particular
these problems are: (a) the relatively slow progress made towards the
creation of the "single internal market" within Community territory due
to the continued prevalence of arguably permitted quantitative restrictions
and equivalent measures on trade between the Member States, and na-
tionally divergent tax regimes, which hitherto have been considered to
necessitate internal frontier controls almost as strict as those at external
frontiers of the Community; and (b) doubts about the correct voting pro-
cedures to be adopted in the Council of the Communities (the primary
Community legislative body) ever since the qualified majority procedures
laid down in the Basic Treaties were voluntarily (though arguably, ille-
gally) abandoned by Member States pursuant to the Luxembourg Accords
of 1965-66. These procedures recognized a State's right of veto whenever
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I. Single European Act (SEA), Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/86;
U.K. Command Paper Comnd. 9758, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 506 (1986).
2. I.e., The European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC), Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140; The European Economic Community Treaty (EEC), Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11; and The European Atomic Energy Community Treaty (Euratom), March 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167.
572 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
its own important national interests were involved, but there was no
agreement as to the definition of such interests, nor as to how their ex-
istence or violation was to be determined if disputed. The resulting legal
and procedural obscurity did little for intra-Community comity.
The Single European Act contains detailed provisions (especially in
articles 6-10) specifying new rules on when the Council requires a unan-
imous and when merely a qualified majority vote will suffice. The Act
also gives greater powers to influence (though not to initiate) legislation
to the European (i.e., Community) "Parliament." Incidentally, the latter
body is now definitively referred to as "the European Parliament," whereas
the Basic Treaties advisedly called it "the Assembly." Although directly
elected, the European Parliament is still not a parliament in the true sense
of having its own legislative powers, which are reserved to the Council
and the Commission of the European Communities. However, both by
judicious use of its political opportunities, and through these provisions,
the Parliament's de facto power to control the legislation of the Council
and the Commission is steadily increasing.
The problem of the creation of the single internal market is the subject
of articles 13-19. In particular article 13 takes the bold step of amending
the EEC Treaty so as to commit the Community to the final establishment
of the internal market, which "shall comprise an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. ' 3 by
December 31, 1992, at the latest. National taxation is to be given special
attention, 4 and harmonization measures in the fields of "health, safety,
environmental protection and consumer protection will take as a base a
high level of protection.' 5
A Member State's right to apply or permit quantitative restrictions or
equivalent measures in its trade with other Member States under the
safeguard provisions of article 36, EEC, 6 or to protect the environment,
is subjected to a new scrutiny procedure before the commission if in
derogation from harmonization measures adopted under the single market
creation policy, although such measures may themselves provide for pro-
visional safeguards subject to Community control. 7
Amendments are made 8 to the Basic Treaties that allow the Council,
at the request of the Court of Justice of the European Communities 9 to
3. New art. 8A, EEC, second paragraph, as supplied by art. 13, SEA.
4. Art. 17, SEA, amending art. 99, EEC.
5. New art. 100A, EEC, third paragraph, as supplied by art. 18, SEA.
6. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), March 24, 1948, art. XX,
55 U.N.T.S. 194, on which art. 36, EEC, is based.
7. New art. 100A, EEC, fourth and fifth paragraphs, as supplied by art. 18, SEA.
8. See arts. 4-5, 11-12, and 26-27, SEA.
9. Hereinafter ECJ.
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create a new Community court of first instance, "attached to" the ECJ,
with jurisdiction to hear such classes of action or proceeding as may be
determined, brought by natural or legal persons, but not by Member States
or Community Institutions, 10 and not by way of requests for preliminary
rulings on points of Community law made by a national court of a Member
State. I I These actions will still be heard by the ECJ, which also will hear
appeals on points of law from the new Community trial court. This will
be, in effect, the first Community analogy to a U.S. federal district court,
in having only first instance jurisdiction. Some questions remain about
the court, such as what its subject-matter jurisdiction will be; whether it
will sit, like the ECJ, only in Luxembourg, or in all Member States ter-
ritories; if the latter, whether in permanent session in each or on a kind
of circuit; and what its relationship will be with the various complex
proposals for a Community Patent Appeals Court (COPAC), to hear ap-
peals in matters relating to Community patents under the Community
Patents Convention, Luxembourg, 1975,12 when that convention is at last
brought into effect.
Other provisions of the SEA are designed to promote greater inter-
Member State cooperation and coordination in the fields of economic and
monetary policy, 13 social policy, 14 economic and social cohesion, 15 re-
search and technological development, 16 and protection of the environ-
ment. 17 To some extent these articles entail subscription to objectives
going beyond those specified in the Basic Treaties.
Finally, in title 11118 the Community Member States have bound them-
selves to cooperate in the sphere of foreign policy, i.e., to "endeavour
jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy."19
Insofar as this commitment encompasses all kinds of matters quite
outside the limited economic objectives, associated with the creation of
a Customs Union and a Common Market, of the Basic Treaties, the new
Act is indicative of the current movement towards a political, and not
merely an economic, union in the Community. Although this movement
10. These organizations could be defendants to such actions.
11. See arts. 177, EEC; 41, ECSC; or 15, Euratom.
12. [1976] O.J.L. 17/1.
13. Art. 20, SEA.
14. Arts. 21-22, SEA, emphasizes the working environment and the health and safety of
employees.
15. Art. 23, SEA, puts special emphasis on the removal of economic disparities between
regions.
16. Art. 24, SEA.
17. Art. 25, SEA, reads in part: "based on the principles that ... environmental damage
should as a priority be rectified at source, and that the polluter should pay."
18. Art. 30, SEA.
19. Art. 30(1), SEA.
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is still not strong outside the halls of Community institutions, the problems
of South Africa and of international terrorism have recently acted as a
catalyst for those favoring a more supranational approach to European
foreign policy issues. The new structural element-known as European
Political Cooperation-will involve the regular (at least four times a year)
meeting of Member State Foreign Ministers quite apart from their (or
other ministers') normal meetings to discuss and enact purely Community
business in the Council. 20 The Commission must be associated with such
meetings. 21 Furthermore, the Commission and the Presidency of the
Council must ensure, as far as possible, consistency between the policy
of the European Political Cooperation and the external (i.e., purely eco-
nomic) policy of the Communities. 22 Moreover, the European Parliament
must be informed and its views considered, on any Political Cooperation
policy, which further increases the Parliament's political power. 23
The European Single Act will be given effect in the United Kingdom
national law by the (U.K.) European Communities (Amendment) Act
1986, apart from title III on foreign policy, which is regarded as a matter
of executive discretion not amenable to national legislative treatment.
This separation between "Community Law" and "European Political
Cooperation Law" is consistent with the approach of the Single Act itself,
which specifies that title III does not affect the provisions of the Basic
Treaties or the subsequent modifications thereto, and is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the ECJ. 24
The European Single Act enters into force one month after the deposit
of the instrument of ratification by the last Member State. 25
II. Competition (Antitrust) Law
A. THE LIABILITY OF MEMBER STATE GOVERNMENTS
IN COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS
In the past, a frequent analysis of the competition provisions, articles
85-94, of the EEC Treaty assumed that Member State governments could
only infringe articles 92-94 (on Prohibited State Aids), which are addressed
solely to such governments. Articles 85 (prohibiting restrictive agree-
ments, decisions, and practices), 86 (prohibiting abuses of a dominant
position), and 90 (concerning public sector undertakings) all involved the
20. Art. 30(3)(a), SEA.
21. Art. 30(3)(b), SEA.
22. Art. 30(5), SEA.
23. Art. 30(4), SEA.
24. Arts. 31-32, SEA.
25. Art. 33(2), SEA.
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activities of undertakings, and whatever that term encompasses, a gov-
ernment is certainly not an undertaking. Articles 87-89 are merely pro-
cedural and empowering, and article 91 (concerned with intra-Community
dumping) is a spent force once internal tariff barriers are removed between
member States. 26 A similar analysis can be applied to the analogous pro-
visions, articles 65-67, of the ECSC Treaty.
This analysis is, of course, correct as far as it goes, but other aspects
of governmental obligations under Community law are now being em-
phasized in relation to competition policy. A Member State can be sued
before the ECJ, by the Commission under article 169, EEC, or another
Member State under article 170, EEC, for a declaration that it has breached
its Community obligations. These commitments include an obligation not
to operate a State commercial monopoly in goods discriminatorily, under
article 37, EEC; not to enact or maintain in force any measure contrary
to Treaty rules, in particular, articles 85-94, EEC, under article 5, EEC,
to promote and not to hinder the attainment of the Community objectives
set out in article 3, EEC, which include the institution of undistorted
competition in intra-Community trade (article 3(f)).
In Cullet v. Centre Lecterc27 the French Government statutorily fixed
minimum retail prices for petrol (gasoline) in order to base prices on the
cost and selling prices of French oil refineries. As a result, certain oil
imports, which could otherwise have benefited from lower prices at for-
eign refineries, were less attractive. Retailers wishing to sell imported oil
below the fixed minimum sued to contest the validity of the Government's
action. The ECJ it was held that while a State cannot infringe article 85,
not being itself an undertaking, it could infringe articles 5 and 3(f) by
legislating, or operating legislation, so as to jeopardize the proper oper-
ation of article 85. While not all governmental minimum price fixing is
illegal, on the facts the French Government was infringing article 30,
EEC, by restricting imports, and no de minimis principle operates on
infringements of articles 30-36 as it does under article 85, (and hence
presumably under articles 5 and 3(f)). In Officie van Justitie v. Van de
Haar and Kaveka de Meern,28 concerning Dutch legislation on excise
duty on tobacco products, the ECJ reaffirmed these principles, adding
26. Tariff barriers, i.e., customs duties and equivalent charges, can and do exist between
Member States during the transitional period following the accession of a new Member
State to the Communities. Here art. 91, EEC, is admitted to have some effect. Less ob-
viously, where a particular type of nontariff barrier has not become an "occupied field"
under Community Commercial Policy provisions (arts. 113-115, EEC) Member States may
retain widely differing external barriers, and in certain circumstances these could give rise
to distortions of intra-Community trade to which art. 91, EEC, could also be relevant.
27. Case 231/81, [1985] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 524.
28. Cases 177-178/82, [1985] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 566.
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that whereas individuals may invoke articles 30-36 against a government,
only the Commission (or another Member State) may invoke article 5 and
3(f), i.e., under the article 169 (or article 170) procedure. However, noth-
ing prevented individuals from urging the Commission to sue for their
protection, 29 and the same facts might very well constitute governmental
infringements of, e.g., both article 30, and articles 5 and 3(f). AGROTAB
v. Distrimas,30 before a national Belgium court, had very similar facts,
and was dealt with in a similar way. In EC Commission v. Italy, Re Import
of Motor Vehicles3' the Commission obtained an interim injunction from
the ECJ against the Italian Government in the course of an action under
article 169 for infringement of article 30, and it would seem this would
also lie in respect of an article 5 infringement.
In BNI du Cognac v. Clair32 and Ministere Public v. Lucas Asjes33 the
ECJ held that agreements, e.g., horizontal price-fixing agreements, prima
facie prohibited by article 85, are not exempt even where made by private
associations under semipublic or statutory powers and then approved and
made mandatory by a public law body (Clair) or by the government itself
(Lucas Asjes). Governments have no power to permit or exempt what
would otherwise be an article 85 infringement. Rather, the government
may itself infringe article 5 in attempting to do so. U.S. federal antitrust
law is of course somewhat similar; see Consumers Union v. Rogers34 on
the inability of the U.S. Government to exempt, by executive action, a
Sherman Act violation.
Moveover, the Commission has only recently begun to use its hitherto
little-remarked powers under article 90(3), EEC. This extraordinary pro-
vision permits the issuance of quasi-legislative decisions with immediate,
detailed, binding effect (e.g., a cease and desist order), even against a
government, where public sector operations are involved and the gov-
ernment is in breach of its obligations under article 90(1), EEC. Thus,
the Commission is given almost the same powers directly to enforce
competition policy against governments as against private individuals and
corporations, apart from the power to impose fines35 for infringements.
29. And if the Commission fails to respond to such urging, conceivably it could be sued
by an individual (with standing to sue) for failure to act, under art. 175 procedure. The
Commission has a duty to enforce the competition rules, under art. 89.
30. [1985] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 294.
31. Case 154/85R, [1986] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 159.
32. Case 123/83, (1985] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 430.
33. Cases 209-213, [1986] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 173. For more information concerning
this case, see infra footnote number 43 and accompanying text.
34. 352 F. Supp. 1319, [1974] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 489.
35. The powers to fine undertakings for infringements are contained in Regulation 17/62
(together with Regulation 1017/68 with respect to road, rail and inland waterway transport).
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For example, in Greece (Public Property and Public Sector Insurance),36
the Greek Government was ordered not to apply Greek legislation that
required Greek public property and public sector risks to be insured only
with Greek insurers. In U.K. Offshore Oil Licensing Policies37 the U.K.
Government was ordered not to draft tenders for supply of ancillary ser-
vices to offshore exploration projects in such a way as to favor British
undertakings, and similarly the French Government was required to aban-
don practices favoring French undertakings in French Government's Oil
Distribution Licensing Scheme,38 where an infringement of article 37 was
also found. 39 In its Notice on Public Procurement Contracts, 1986,40 the
Commission stated its intention to use articles 90(3) and 169 more widely
to discipline governments and quasi-governmental bodies into acceptance
of tenders on a nondiscriminatory competitive basis.
Failure to comply with an order issued under article 90(3) would again
found an action by the Commission (or other Member State) against the
recalcitrant government under article 169 (or article 170) before the ECJ.
No government has ever ignored for long an ECJ declaratory judgment
against it.
B. AIR TRANSPORT AND COMPETITION
As is well-known, whereas articles 85 and 86, EEC (the basic com-
petition rules), apply in principle to all forms of transport, the application
of regulation 17/62 (the basic implementing statute from which the Com-
mission derives most of its competition enforcement powers) is removed
from the transport sector by regulation 141/62. Regulation 1017/68 supplies
those enforcement powers with respect to road, rail, and inland waterway
transport, but so far the Council has not seen fit to enact a regulation
giving the commission enforcement powers with respect to sea and air
transport, considering these matters too politically and diplomatically
sensitive for the blunt application of articles 85 and 86. Hence in particular
air travel between Member States has remained very expensive compared
with world rates.
Lord Bethel, a U.K. member of the European Parliament, attempted
to force progress by bringing a private action against the Commission for
failure to act, under article 175, EEC. The action was nonsuited by the
36. Decision 85/276/EEC, [1985] O.J.L. 152/25.
37. Press Release IP(85)303.
38. Press Release IP(86)355.
39. Art. 37, EEC, requires the nondiscriminatory operation of State monopolies of a
commercial character in goods. No new such monopolies can be created: re German Cordless
Telephones: Press Release IP(85)92.
40. Press Release IP(86)301.
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ECJ, however, for lack of standing to sue. 41 In European Parliament v.
EC Council42 the Parliament brought a similar action in its own name
against the Council. The ECJ held that the Parliament did have standing
to sue under article 175, and that the Council's obligations under article
75, EEC, to provide rules on international transport within the framework
of a common transport policy and (inter alia) the competition rules of the
Treaty, had not been performed. In Ministdre Public v. Lucas Asjes 43
defendants had been prosecuted under French criminal law for violations
of the French Civil Aviation Code in selling air tickets at less than the
licensed prices. These prices had been fixed between airlines and others,
and then approved and made mandatory by the French Government in
accordance with the Code. The French court sought a preliminary ruling
from the ECJ as to whether this price-fixing scheme was contrary to article
85, EEC. The ECJ held that the absence of any implementing regulation
conferring powers of enforcement in respect of air transport did not per
se entail that there was no article 85 infringement. Either a National
Authority for competition enforcement, or the Commission, could have
acted against this scheme and decided it infringed article 85, under their
basic enforcement powers in articles 88 (National Authority) or 89 (Com-
mission). Since no such action or decision had been taken so far, however,
the price fixing must be presumed legal and valid by the French court for
the time being. This judgment is very significant in two respects. First,
it indicates that the Commission has sufficient original powers under ar-
ticle 89 to enforce articles 85 and 86 in respect of sea and air transport,
notwithstanding the absence of a special implementing regulation, i.e. at
least to investigate and to issue a cease and desist order, even if the power
to fine is lacking (and article 89 may even give power to penalize under-
takings). Second, the ECJ seems, in upholding the presumption of the
innocence or validity before national courts of agreements not yet pro-
nounced upon-the so-called doctrine of provisional validity-to have
extended the doctrine drastically. Hitherto the case law has made it clear
that the doctrine only applies to "old" agreements, i.e., those that already
existed before article 85 came to apply to them. At least some part of the
instant scheme must have involved "new" agreements, which in the past
the ECJ has held not to be protected by the presumption.
Finally, the German Federal Supreme Court has asked the ECJ for a
preliminary ruling in the case of Firma Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zen-
trale zur Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerb44 on whether a scheme of
41. Bethel v. EC Council, Case 246/81, [1982] E.C.A. 2277.
42. Case 13/83, [1986] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 138.
43. Cases 209-213/84, [1986] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 173.
44. [19861 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 158.
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